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Plato’s Ring of Corruption
Edward H. Spence
Although corruption has been widely reported and is easily recognized, oft en un-
fortunately aft er the event, its nature and causes are usually not well understood 
and remain for the most part conceptually unclear. Th is conceptual lack of clarity 
concerning the nature of corruption helps perpetuate its reign. In order to provide 
a better conceptual and ethical understanding of corruption, I have developed a 
philosophical model that seeks to conceptually identify, explain and ethically evalu-
ate corruption through fi rst identifying and defi ning its characterizing features. To 
that end, the paper will provide a philosophical account of contemporary corrup-
tion1 by determining, through an analysis of the Myth of Gyges in Plato’s Republic, 
the essential features that characterize corporate and other types of corruption. Th e 
analysis will adopt an applied philosophical approach, one that will attempt to reveal 
the signifi cance and relevance of Plato’s Myth of Gyges for an applied philosophical 
understanding of contemporary corruption. 
1. Introduction
In this paper I will attempt to provide a philosophical account of corruption by 
determining through an analysis of the Myth of Gyges in Plato’s Republic (1952: 
Book II, 359–61), some if not all of its essential characterising features. I will then 
apply those features to a specifi c area of professional practice to determine if those 
features of corruption apply generally to typical cases of professional and possibly 
other areas of recognized and not so well recognized areas of corrupt activity. 
Although a lot has been written on corruption in recent years, most of that lit-
erature focuses primarily on political and economic corruption which primarily 
examines its extent, sources and fi nancial consequences. My present concern is to 
look more widely and more deeply at the phenomenon of corruption from a philo-
sophical perspective. By identifying its essential characterising features, I hope 
1  For a more comprehensive philosophical account of corruption and anti-corruption, see S. Miller, 
P. Roberts and E. Spence 2005. Corruption and Anti-Corruption: An Applied Philosophical Approach. 
Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
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to demonstrate that corruption is more pervasive than fi rst thought and extends 
beyond the political and economic boundaries of power and wealth. 
Traditional accounts of corruption defi ne it as “eff orts to secure wealth or power 
through illegal means — private gain at public expense” (Lipset and Lenz, 2000:
112). In defi ning corruption too narrowly in terms of illegal or unethical acquisi-
tion of power or wealth, these traditional accounts of corruption though partly 
right, fail to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nature of corruption. An 
analysis that would indicate that corruption extends beyond the narrow limits of 
what corruption is ordinarily taken to be.
2. Th e Ring of Gyges
Th e following is a brief exposition of the Myth of Gyges as related by Glaucon to 
Socrates in Book II of Plato’s Republic.
Once upon a time a certain shepherd from Lydia named Gyges whilst tending 
to his sheep found a ring which he put on his fi nger. Gyges soon discovered that by 
turning the ring on his fi nger he could make himself invisible. A few days later he 
went to the palace with a delegation of shepherds to see the King. Th en by making 
himself invisible, he seduced the Queen, killed the King, and assumed total power 
by becoming the new King. Glaucon continues the story by asking us to imagine 
an ordinary putative person who like Gyges has the ability through a possession 
of a similar magical ring to render himself invisible thus allowing that person the 
opportunity to act unethically at will with total impunity. 
Th rough the words of Glaucon, Socrates’ interlocutor in Book II of Plato’s Re-
public, Plato asks us to consider what pos-
sible reason would a Gyges-like person have 
for acting ethically towards others if he had 
the ability to act unethically under the cloak 
of invisibility thus allowing the agency of his 
unethical conduct to remain invisible from 
others? For his ability to render the agency of 
his corrupt deeds invisible will in turn provide 
him with total impunity from the social disap-
proval and/or punishment or other punitive 
repercussions for his unethical conduct that 
is ordinarily reciprocated from others or the 
state. Moreover, under the cloak of invisibility, 
the corrupt agent would be able to act corrupt-
ly whilst maintaining an appearance of ethical 
probity and rectitude.
Glaucon refers to this possibility as the 
“highest reach of injustice, being deemed just Plato (c. 427–347 BC).
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when you are not”. He labels this “the most perfect injustice” (Plato, 1952: Book II, 
361). Given such a possibility, what possible reason then would someone like Gyges 
have for not being corrupt but being non-corrupt and moral instead? Especially, if 
we assume that the latter option was known to the agent to be to his personal disad-
vantage and personal instrumental loss? As Glaucon says to Socrates, one would be 
mad to be moral under those circumstances. Better to be immoral and corrupt if it is 
to your gain and advantage and simply appear to be moral and non-corrupt. Follow-
ing Glaucon, I will refer to this proposition as the condition of “perfect injustice”. Th e 
question of “why be moral” under Gygean conditions of perfect injustice is referred 
to in the ethics literature as the “authoritative question of morality” (Gewirth, 1978:
3). Th e philosophical debate as to whether a compelling answer can be given to that 
question is still ongoing. I will not pursue that debate here for lack of space. I will, 
however, consider the kind of answer that Socrates might off er and indeed it is the 
kind of answer pursued by Plato in the Republic.
Plato, through the character of Socrates, argues that neither absolute power 
nor invisibility exempts anyone from acting ethically towards others. Apart from 
harming others through one’s unethical conduct, Plato thinks that in acting un-
ethically one also harms oneself. He argues that unethical conduct is self-defeating 
for it corrupts the character of the person that acts unethically and causes internal 
disharmony that prevents the perpetrator of wrong deeds from being truly happy. 
Plato believes that behaving ethically provides the best means of living a good 
and happy life and it is only through ignorance that people act unethically since 
everyone wishes to be happy. Plato identifi es happiness with virtuous activity and 
the possession of an ethical character which together are necessary for internal 
harmony and integrity both for the individual citizen as well as the State. In par-
allel fashion, Plato also argues that corporate or institutional injustice can create 
disharmony and confl ict within the State that can ultimately threaten civil author-
ity and the very stability of the State itself. Hopefully our discussion will prove 
more than a footnote to Plato. I will return to Plato later for further discussion of 
these issues.
3. Th e Characterizing Features of Corruption
Five essential features that emerge from the discussion of the Myth of Gyges by 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, that seem, at least initially, to characterize corruption, 
are the possession of power, a disposition to exercise that power, an opportunity to 
exercise that power, invisibility or concealment, and self-regarding gain. I will defi ne 
power as the possession of the ability or capacity to act in a manner capable of 
bringing about a certain intended desired outcome. A disposition to exercise that 
power, as the possession of a pre-disposition, pro-attitude or willingness to pur-
posefully exercise that power. Opportunity, as having the opportunity, either pre-
sented to oneself or engineered by oneself, to engage in some activity for which 
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one’s has the power and the pre-disposition to engage in. Invisibility or concealment, 
as the ability or quality an agent has for keeping the motives and the identity of the 
agency of his actions invisible, concealed or hidden from the gaze of others. In some 
special circumstances, the condition of invisibility can be self-directed. Directed, 
that is, towards the agent himself. Under these special circumstances, let us refer to 
them as circumstances of self-deception, the corrupt agent through specious ration-
alizations or through plain ignorance, deludes oneself in thinking that his actions or 
his motives or both, are not corrupt. Moreover, that his actions or motives involved 
in those corrupt activities are ethically appropriate. Some instances of “confl icts of 
interest” will fall into this category of corruption. Self-regarding gain is any gain, not 
necessarily fi nancial, which accrues to the agent personally or to a group of which 
his is a member, as a result of his or the group’s actions. With regard to the condition 
of invisibility, whilst the actions themselves may not be and need not be invisible, for 
in many cases they would be visible at least with regard to their eff ects and conse-
quences, the identity of their agency will be invisible. Or at least the corrupt agent’s 
intention will be to keep the identity of the agency of his corrupt activity invisible.
I will argue, pending further investigation, that these fi ve characterizing features 
of corruption, usually if not always, are present and accompany acts of corruption. 
For without power, understood as the ability to act in a manner capable of bringing 
about a certain intended desired outcome, one cannot commit a corrupt act. With-
out a disposition to exercise that power willingly, the possession of power to engage 
in corrupt activities may not be exercised. Similarly, through lack of opportunity 
one cannot engage in corrupt activity even when one has both the power and the 
disposition to act corruptly.
Invisibility seems to also be a characterizing feature of corruption that is usu-
ally, if not always, present in instances of corrupt activity. Invisibility seems to be 
at least instrumentally desirable,2 for without invisibility one might not be able to 
evade detection thus escaping possible social disapproval and punitive retribution 
from others or the State. Even for a Gyges-like person, keeping the identity of the 
agency of his immoral acts hidden, lest he invokes social disapproval which may 
eventually undermine his power to rule and invite retribution from those he harms 
through his unethical conduct, would be prudent. Like Glaucon’s perfectly unjust 
person, the perfectly corrupt person is one who maintains an outward appearance 
of probity, justice and morality, whilst carrying out his corrupt deeds in secret. In 
2 By “instrumentally desirable” I mean the kind of practical prudence attributable to an instrumen-
tally rational agent intending to act corruptly in an environment in which corruption is either 
illegal or if not illegal at least generally considered unethical. In such an environment it would be 
a desirable requirement of instrumental rational agency that the agent intending to engage in cor-
rupt activity should take the required measures to keep the agency of his corrupt actions invisible 
or concealed. For not to do so, could prove self-defeating and therefore instrumentally irrational. 
An underlined presupposition in my argument is that the agent addressed throughout this paper is 
an instrumentally rational agent.  
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this way he maximizes his self-regarding gain, which can either accrue to him per-
sonally or to a group to which he belongs or cause to which he is committed, with 
little or no instrumental cost to himself, his group or his cause;3 at least in terms of 
avoiding social disapproval and/or punitive retribution from others or the State. 
Invisibility, therefore, seems to be a characterizing feature of corruption, at least 
for instrumentally rational agents. For it would be self-defeating for those agents to 
engage in corrupt activities openly and transparently since that would minimize, 
not maximize their means of achieving their corrupt goals at little or no ethical or 
legal cost to themselves.4 
If all the above features are regular features that normally accompany typical 
cases of corruption they are nevertheless not suffi  cient in characterizing corrup-
tion. Th ey are not suffi  cient for if they were, a house burglar or a professional bank 
robber would be deemed corrupt. However, though immoral, the actions of the 
house burglar and bank robber are not what we would normally describe as cor-
rupt. Th e missing suffi  cient condition is a socially pre-established fi duciary rela-
tionship of trust between the corrupt person or group and the person or persons or 
group who are harmed in some way by the corrupt person’s or the corrupt group’s 
actions. Th e reason why house burglars or bank robbers are not deemed corrupt 
is because there is an absence of a prior fi duciary relationship of trust between the 
burglar and the bank robber on the one hand, and those who are harmed by their 
actions on the other; namely, the household owners, the banks and their customers. 
By contrast, typical cases of corruption and its sub-species fraud, involve an addi-
tional breach of a socially pre-established fi duciary relationship of trust between 
the corrupt agents and their victims, namely, those wronged by the corrupt agents’ 
actions. Insofar as the role of a King, at least in principle if not always in practice, is 
to dispense equal justice to all his subjects then Gyges abuses that role by using the 
invisibility off ered to him by the magical ring to act unjustly against his subjects. 
In so doing, Gyges abuses a fi duciary duty of trust he owes to his subjects in his 
role as the King. He does so, at least under the theory of the social contract that 
considers that legitimate authority can only be conferred to the offi  ce occupied 
by a King or other ruler, on the basis of his subjects’ or citizens’ free and uncon-
strained consent. 
3  The self-regarding gain need not be merely a self-directed gain accruing to the corrupt agent himself. 
Thus the perceived gain from the corrupt activities of some of Nixon’s associates in the Watergate 
affair was self-regarding, in the sense that it benefited the Republican Party of which they were 
members, but not self-directed in the sense that it benefited or was intended to benefit those associ-
ates personally. 
4 Unless of course the corrupt agent is seeking exposure. By hoping that his corrupt deeds would 
be discovered and exposed, the agent might perhaps be seeking atonement for his corrupt deeds 
through exposure and subsequent punishment. Under these psychological circumstances, the 
in strumentally rational agent’s non-avoidance of concealment for his corrupt agency is not self-
defeating as its goal is maximized through the means used to bring about his eventual exposure 
and punishment. 
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Th e addition of the condition of a fi duciary duty is in keeping with one of the 
traditional dictionary defi nitions of “corruption”, namely, “the changing from the 
naturally sound condition” or “the turning from a sound into an unsound impure 
condition” or “the perversion of anything from an original state of purity” (Little, 
Fowler, Coulson and Onions, 1973:431).
Th e fi duciary relationship can be articulated in political, professional, social 
or familial terms. For example, there is a socially and professionally recognized 
pre-established fi duciary duty of trust, one that is constitutive of the role of police 
offi  cers, that they will uphold justice and maintain law and public order. Insofar as 
police offi  cers act in ways that undermine that role, for example, by taking brides 
or running drug syndicates or organizing armed robberies, then they act corruptly 
for they abuse their fi duciary duty of trust to the public to uphold justice and the 
law and not subvert them through illegal or unethical practices. 
Notice that if we were to remove the need for trust, whether it is familial, social, 
professional or political, we would revert to a Hobbesian State of Nature. Interest-
ingly, however, corruption involves a halfway house comprising of actions that fall 
into a Hobbesian Sate of Nature on the one hand, and the agents of those actions 
which operate unethically in a clandestine manner within a contractually Hob-
besian moral society. It’s a case of having your civic cake and eating it too. Th us 
typically, a corrupt person avoids the ethical obligations of contractual and fi duci-
ary relationships based on trust by operating under conditions approaching those 
of perfect injustice. He does so by committing his corrupt deeds under a cloak 
of invisibility that allows him to avoid the social disapproval and retribution of 
socially recognized unethical and illegal conduct, whilst at the same time securing 
the social approbation of recognized ethical conduct by wearing the dissembling 
mask of morality; at least in the negative sense of not appearing to be conducting 
himself immorally.
4. Th e Corrosion of Character
It would appear then that as long as the corrupt person ensures that the agency 
of his corrupt deeds remains undetected, he could reap the gains of immoral con-
duct with no moral or instrumental cost to himself. Let us understand moral cost 
here as measured solely in terms of social disapproval and social repercussions in 
the form of punishment from others or the State. Moreover, if the corrupt person 
is able to maintain a semblance of moral conduct he could pass himself off  as a 
person of moral probity. As we saw earlier, Glaucon refers to this possibility as the 
“highest reach of injustice being just deemed just when you are not” (Plato, 1952: 
Book II, 361).
Although under Gygean conditions of perfect injustice one could in theory 
and possibly in practice avoid detection and thus act corruptly with impunity, one 
could not, however, remain totally immune from moral jeopardy. I want to suggest 
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that the moral cost to a Gyges-like character operating corruptly under conditions 
of perfect injustice might be one of emotional and cognitive dissonance. For on 
the assumption that a Gyges-like character is minimally rational and subject to 
the human sensibilities and sentiments of a normal socialised person, he might be 
liable to experience the inner psychological stress and strain caused by emotional 
and cognitive dissonance; a dissonance, between his real corrupt motives and 
actions on the one hand, and his false and merely apparent moral reputation on the 
other. Like Macbeth, he would be liable to inner confl ict and the loss of inner peace. 
Th e double-life of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hide is no life for one who at least has some of 
the cognitive and aff ective sensibilities and social sensitivities of normal socialised 
persons; unless one can successfully engage in self-deception about one’s corrupt 
agency or corrupt actions. Self-deception, however, may not always be practically 
feasible for all agents who engage in corruption. 
If I am right, impunity from acting immorally does not guarantee immunity 
from moral jeopardy in the form of inner confl ict and the loss of inner peace. 
If honesty is the best policy because it generates trust and trust is the necessary 
fabric for the social tapestry of social inter-relations and interactions, integrity of 
character is the indemnity against the moral jeopardy of inner confl ict that might 
be caused by emotional and cognitive dissonance. It is for this reason that integrity 
is morally important. It has the dual function of protecting a person from psycho-
logical dissonance, as well as providing personal motivation for avoiding corrupt 
conduct, even under favourable Gygean conditions of perfect injustice. 
Plato is right to make integrity of character the glue that bonds individual self-
regarding prudential integrity with social other-regarding morality. Th e underlying 
factor is avoidance of harm and generation of good not only to others but also for 
one self. Our moral social inter-relation with each other is closely related to our 
moral intra-relation to our own individual characters and thus renders ethical 
conduct both socially as well as personally benefi cial and desirable. By harming 
others through corrupt conduct we can at least potentially harm ourselves pre-
cisely because of the close relation between social external morality, on the one 
hand, and individual internal morality, instantiated through integrity of character, 
on the other. According to the Stoic philosophers this relation is intrinsic because 
of our metaphysical inter-relation of belonging to the one same unitary rational 
cosmic reality. But I won’t argue here whether the Stoics were right or not. It suffi  ces 
for our present purposes that the relation between social morality and personal 
morality is close, even if it is not intrinsic.
In conclusion of this section, although one can quite possibly act corruptly with 
impunity under conditions of perfect injustice, one might not be able to remain 
totally immune from the moral jeopardy of having one’s character corrupted. Th e 
possible loss is one of inner peace and harmony through cognitive and emotional 
dissonance resulting from a potential loss of personal integrity as well as the psy-
chological harm one might suff er through feelings of guilt and remorse, both with 
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regard to oneself and with regard to others. Moreover, the very attractive instru-
mental benefi t of acting corruptly under conditions of perfect injustice is undercut 
and compromised by an unattractive potential loss of peace of mind resulting from 
a possible cognitive and emotional dissonance.
5. A Case Study in Corruption
In conclusion, I will illustrate the application of my adapted Platonic model of cor-
ruption and anti-corruption discussed above, through a contemporary case study 
in media corruption. Th e same model can be used to identify, analyse and evaluate 
other types of corruption, including corporate, political, sport, religious, medical, 
educational, and police corruption, among others. 
In what has come to be known in Australia as the “Th e Cash for Comment” case, 
John Laws, a well-known Australian radio celebrity, abused his editorial power for 
the purpose of infl uencing the opinion of his 2 million-strong audience favour-
ably towards a group of Banks for a sum of $1.2m. Th e fi nancial transaction of 
the $1.2m between Laws and the Banks was carried out in secret and concealed 
from the public, including his audience. Just a few weeks prior to his deal with the 
Banks, Laws had repeatedly criticized the Banks on his radio program for acting 
unethically in imposing unjustifi ed bank fees on their customers and cutting back 
on vital services.
Laws’ favourable comments of the Banks following the $1.2m deal can be seen 
as a typical instance of an advertorial. Advertorials are advertisements masquerad-
ing as editorials. In the case of advertorials, the diff erence between advertising and 
editorial comment is oft en blurred to the advantage of the advertisers and their 
clients. Th e public would have been led to think that Laws was expressing a genu-
inely unbiased and informed view about the banks when in eff ect and unbeknown 
to his listeners he was advertising the banks’ “merits” for a price, off ering editorial 
comment for cash. 
If I am right about the six features that characterize corruption, Laws’ cash for 
comment incident counts as a form of corruption because it displays all those 
features. Laws had the power, the disposition, the opportunity, he kept the deal of 
the 1.2m payment from the Banks invisible from the public and his listeners, he 
did it for a self-regarding gain (money), and he violated a fi duciary duty of trust 
which he owed to his listeners of informing them on matters of public interest in 
an honest, truthful and objective manner. In his defense, Laws claimed he was an 
entertainer not a journalist and as such “ethics did not have a hook on him”. How-
ever, even if Laws did not see himself as acting in the role of a journalist, a role 
that in principle, if not always in practice, commits a journalist to informing the 
public truthfully and objectively, his listeners would have perceived him as such. 
It is precisely because his endorsement of the Banks carried more credibility as 
journalistic comment rather than a concealed advertisement that Laws chose to 
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conceal the fact that his comments were bought for cash. Moreover, Laws did all 
this whilst pretending to be informing the public and his audience about matters 
that were in their best interest. He had over the years developed a reputation for a 
defender and guardian of the “battlers” and a public scourge of corrupt or merely 
inept politicians and civil servants. Without too much exaggeration, he packaged 
himself as the “champion of the people”. Laws in other words, like Glaucon’s per-
fectly “unjust person”, appeared just when he was, if my analysis is right, both unjust 
and corrupt.  
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